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Abstract—The paper concerns bandwidth allocation problem
on the telecommunication market where there are many sell-
ers and buyers. Sellers oﬀer the bandwidth of telecommu-
nication links. Buyers are interested in the purchase of the
bandwidth of several links that makes up an end-to-end con-
nection between two nodes of telecommunication network. We
analyze three auction models supporting such a bandwidth
exchange: NSP (network second price), BCBT (model for
balancing communication bandwidth trading) and BCBT-CG
which is a modiﬁcation of BCBT that applies column genera-
tion technique. All of these models concern divisible network
resources, treat bandwidth of telecommunication links as an
elementary commodity oﬀered for sale, and allow for purchas-
ing bandwidth along multiple paths joining two telecommuni-
cation nodes. All of them also aim at maximizing the social
welfare. Considered auction models have been compared in
the respect of economic and computational eﬃciency. Exper-
imental studies have been performed on several test instances
based on the SNDlib library data sets.
Keywords—bandwidth auctions, divisible commodities, end-to-
end connections, multi-commodity trade, multi-path routing.
1. Introduction
In this paper we consider a bandwidth market [1], [2] on
which many sellers and many buyers are interested in the
exchange of the links’ bandwidth. The bandwidth of link
is an elementary network resource that allows for trans-
mitting some amount of data between two telecommunica-
tion nodes over given period of time. Telecommunication
network consists of many nodes connected by numerous
links. Therefore, on the bandwidth market there are typ-
ically many diﬀerent network resources that may be of-
fered for sale by diﬀerent sellers, e.g., companies laying
cables, network providers and other telecommunication link
owners. Generally, the buyers, such as network providers,
service providers and geographically spread organizations
want to purchase the bandwidth of several links to realize
speciﬁc network services.
Here, we focus on the case, in which buyers are interested
in obtaining end-to-end connections. The end-to-end con-
nection is a network service that allows for transmitting
data between two arbitrary nodes in the telecommunication
network. These nodes do not have to be directly connected
by single link, but they may be joined by a path consisting
of many links. Thus, in order to provide an end-to-end
connection with predeﬁned capacity, path(s) joining source
and destination nodes of this end-to-end connection have
to be determined and bandwidth of those path(s) has to be
allocated to this end-to-end connection.
Each buyer or seller participates in the bandwidth exchange
in order to achieve one’s individual goals. The buyer de-
rives utility from getting the end-to-end connection and he
wants to purchase this end-to-end connection for the mini-
mum price. The diﬀerence between buyer’s utility and the
end-to-end connection price deﬁnes one’s net beneﬁt from
the trade. On the other hand the seller incurs the cost of
network resource and he wants to sell the network resource
for the maximum price. The diﬀerence between the net-
work resource price and the seller’s cost deﬁnes one’s net
beneﬁt from the trade. Rational market participants aims
at maximization of their net beneﬁts.
The sum of all market participants’ net beneﬁts is called
social welfare. From the global point of view it is desir-
able to ensure economic eﬃciency of bandwidth market
in terms of social welfare. In other words, the problem is
to determine the allocation of network resources oﬀered
for sale to end-to-end connections oﬀered for purchase that
will result in the maximum social welfare. This problem
is complicated by the fact that the buyers’ utilities and
sellers’ costs are their private information and market par-
ticipants may not have interest in sincerely eliciting this
information.
Currently, the bandwidth market is organized on the basis
of bilateral agreements. This means that the trade is car-
ried out by making deals between one seller and one buyer
that have to negotiate with each other the contract terms.
Because no one is encouraged to reveal one’s private in-
formation, these negotiations are often very complex and
time consuming. Also, the details about transactions are
rather privately held than publicly announced information.
This makes the whole trading process non-transparent and it
limits access to important market related data (e.g., prices).
If there are many paths realizing speciﬁc end-to-end con-
nection, the buyer having limited information about links’
prices may have diﬃculties in determining the cheapest
one. Moreover, bilateral agreements do not support buyer
in obtaining end-to-end connection when this end-to-end
connection cannot be provided by a single seller. In such
a case the buyer must independently negotiate with sev-
eral owners of links to realize desired end-to-end connec-
tion. This leads to the risk of purchasing incomplete set
of links if the trade negotiations fail with one of seller,
whereas agreements with other sellers would be drawn up
and signed.
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Thus, there is a need for more sophisticated organization
of bandwidth market. Some authors [3], [4] claim that
the introduction of new forms of bandwidth trading is only
a matter of time. One of the key aspects that may facilitate
this process is a development and application of new market
mechanisms, such as bandwidth auctions [4].
2. Bandwidth Auction Models
Auction is one of the oldest way of performing the trade on
the market. It is characterized by the fact that it deﬁnes the
kind of oﬀers the auction participants may submit to report
their willingness of selling or purchasing commodities be-
ing traded and that it deﬁnes the formal rules that allow on
the basis of submitted oﬀers to determine what commodi-
ties are sold or bought by each auction participant. The
formal rules of the auction are typically divided into the
allocation rule that determines the amount of commodities
being exchanged between each buyer and seller, and the
pricing rule that sets revenues of sellers and payments of
buyers.
2.1. Overview of Bandwidth Auctions
In literature, there are many auction models that support
end-to-end connection trading on the bandwidth market.
These models make diﬀerent assumptions about the band-
width auction.
One of the most important assumptions relates to the num-
ber of network providers that may participate in the band-
width auction as a seller. One group of the models [5]–[10]
concerns one-sided auction, in which the bandwidth of all
telecommunication links is oﬀered for sale by one auction-
eer to many buyers. Mostly, the auctioner is, or acts on
behalf of, a provider that owns or manages the telecommu-
nication network. Although some of these models [8]–[10]
can be used to trade network resources owned by dif-
ferent providers, they require that all of them pass their
true private information to the auctioneer. Therefore, these
auction models do not take into account that the network
resource providers may act strategically competiting with
each other.
However, proceeding bandwidth market liberalization fa-
vors competition between providers and it seems that above
assumption may be too restrictive. So, there is a need of
market mechanisms that would allow to perform the band-
width exchange between many sellers and many buyers. It
is even believed that the development of double auctions
supporting bandwidth trading is one of the most promising
new research directions [11]. So far, there are a few mod-
els for double auction that supports end-to-end connection
trading [12]–[17].
The another important assumption concerns the divisibil-
ity of network resources. Some auction models allow for
trading bandwidth in modules of predeﬁned capacity [10],
[14]–[17] while others treat network resources as fully di-
visible commodities [5]–[9], [12], [13]. Both these as-
sumptions may be resonable depending on the telecom-
munication technology. In the lower layers of telecom-
munication network, the links’ capacities have often mod-
ular character, e.g., optic ﬁbres, SDH modules. In the
higher layers, the bandwidth of links may be divided in al-
most every real fraction of Mbit/s, e.g., ATM virtual paths,
IP ﬂows.
The last assumption, mentioned here, relates to the way of
supporting end-to-end connection trading. Most of the pro-
posed auction models require that the buyer speciﬁes the
single path to be used to realize desired end-to-end connec-
tion. These auction models ensure that the same amount
of bandwidth will be allocated to the buyer at each link
constituing speciﬁed path. A more ﬂexible approach from
the buyer point of view is applied in the Network Sec-
ond Price model (NSP) [12]. The NSP model allows the
buyer to specify many paths that can be used to realize
desired end-to-end connection. The NSP model considers
all this paths when allocating bandwidth to particular end-
to-end connection, so the buyer can increase the chance of
purchasing end-to-end connection with predeﬁned capac-
ity by specifying many paths. The Kelly’s model [5] and
the model for balancing communication bandwidth trad-
ing (BCBT) [13] are even more ﬂexible than NSP, be-
cause they allow the buyer to submit an oﬀer for commod-
ity representing a demand for end-to-end connection. In
these models buyer does not have to specify any paths, but
only source and destination nodes of the end-to-end connec-
tion. Therefore, these models seem to be more convenient
to the buyer as one does not have to know the network
topology.
In paper [18] double auction models concerning bandwidth
as a modular commodity have been analyzed. Here we
compare double auction models supporting end-to-end con-
nection trading that treat bandwidth as fully divisible com-
modity. To this group of auction models belong the BCBT
and NSP models that are known from the literature and
also the BCBT-CG model that is here proposed.
2.2. Comparision of the BCBT and NSP Models
The BCBT and NSP models relate to the auctions that can
be classiﬁed as sealed-bid single-round double auctions.
This means that in both auction models sellers and buy-
ers submit their oﬀers knowing nothing about the oﬀers
of other auction participants and the auction mechanism
determines the allocation, and pricing only on the basis of
submitted oﬀers. In both models the bandwidth of telecom-
munication links is an elementary, fully divisible commod-
ity. Let E be a set of all telecommunication links. In NSP
model there is no information about which network nodes
are connected by particular link e ∈ E . In BCBT model
there is a set V denoting all telecommunication nodes. For
each link e ∈ E and each node v ∈V the parameter ave de-
ﬁnes if node v is a source (ave = 1) or destination (ave =−1)
node of link e or that the node v is not incident to link e
(ave = 0). Thus BCBT model has a full information about
the network topology.
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The NSP and BCBT models allow the seller to submit the
sell oﬀer for particular link. With each link e∈ E there can
be many sell oﬀers involved that form the set S(e). The set
of all sell oﬀers is denoted by S =∪e∈ES(e). In both models
each sell oﬀer l ∈ S is characterized by two parameters:
Sl – the minimum unit price at which seller is willing to
sell the bandwidth of link, and xmaxl – the maximum amount
of bandwidth oﬀered for sale by the seller.
Considered auction models diﬀer substantially in the com-
modity type for which the buy oﬀer can be submitted. Let
D denote the set of all buy oﬀers. In the NSP model, the
buy oﬀer is related with a set of possible paths. The buyer
that submits the buy oﬀer d ∈ D speciﬁes the set of pos-
sible paths Pd . For each path p ∈ Pd and each link e he
has to deﬁne a binary parameter bed p that equals 1 if link e
belongs to path p and equals 0 otherwise. This means that
the buyer must know the network topology in order to cor-
rectly specify the paths. In the case of BCBT the buy oﬀer
is involved with a commodity that represents a demand for
end-to-end connection. In the buy oﬀer d the buyer spec-
iﬁes only a source node sd and a destination node td . In
both NSP and BCBT models the buyer also has to deﬁne
in the buy oﬀer d two parameters: Ed – the maximum unit
price at which the buyer is willing to buy the bandwidth of
end-to-end connection, and xmaxd – the maximum amount
of bandwidth oﬀered for purchase by the buyer.
The allocation rules of NSP and BCBT models decide,
which oﬀers are accepted aiming at social welfare maxi-
mization. In other words, both allocation rules match sell
and buy oﬀers allocating bandwidth of links oﬀered for sale
to end-to-end connections oﬀered for purchase in order to
achieve the maximum sum of all market participants’ net
beneﬁts. Both allocation rules allow for multipath routing,
i.e., each end-to-end connection may be realized by several
paths. The essential diﬀerence between NSP and BCBT
allocation rules is that the allocation rule of NSP has given
the predeﬁned paths for each end-to-end connection while
the allocation rule of BCBT itself has to determine the
paths for each end-to-end connection. Note that the BCBT
model that has full information about network topology,
considers all paths that can be used to realize particular
end-to-end connection. In the case of NSP model the al-
location rule is restricted to paths speciﬁed by the buyers.
Therefore, for given submitted oﬀers, the NSP model takes
into account only some subset of all allowable paths that
can be generated in the case of BCBT model. The alloca-
tion rules of NSP and BCBT models can be formulated as
linear programming problems with the same objective func-
tions. It is worth to mention that the LP problem deﬁning
NSP allocation rule is a restriction of LP problem deﬁning
BCBT allocation rule. Thus, assuming that for the buyers
it is indiﬀerent what paths are used to satisfy their demands
for end-to-end connections, the allocation obtained by the
NSP model cannot be better in terms of the social welfare
than the one given by the BCBT model.
The NSP and BCBT auction models deﬁne also diﬀerent
pricing rules. NSP adapts VCG-style pricing [12] while
BCBT determines the clearing prices on the basis of dual
prices of LP formulation of its allocation rule. Further we
will focus on the comparison of NSP and BCBT allocation
rules, so we do not discuss here the details of both pricing
rules.
2.3. The BCBT-CG Auction Model
In this paper we propose the BCBT-CG model. The
BCBT-CG model is a modiﬁcation of BCBT model that
diﬀers from BCBT only in the way of determining the
optimal allocation. The allocation rules of BCBT-CG and
BCBT models are equivalent in the respect of social wel-
fare.
In BCBT model the allocation is determined by solving
a LP problem, in which all possible paths for each end-to-
end connection are considered at once. As opposed to this
approach, in BCBT-CG the allocation problem is decom-
posed into the master problem and the subproblem using
column generation technique.
The master problem is a restriction of the allocation prob-
lem deﬁned by BCBT model in which for each buy oﬀer
a set of allowable paths is speciﬁed. Thus, in the master
problem of BCBT-CG model for each buy oﬀer d there is
deﬁned a set of paths Pd with each path described by bi-
nary parameters bed p like in the NSP model. The aim of the
master problem is to determine the optimal (i.e., providing
maximum social welfare) bandwidth allocation assuming
that end-to-end connection can be realized only by the pre-
deﬁned paths.
For given buy oﬀer d let us denote by the variable xd p the
amount of bandwidth allocated at path p ∈ Pd . Then the
variable xd = ∑p∈Pd xd p is the total amount of bandwidth
allocated to end-to-end connection involved with buy of-
fer d. Moreover, let us deﬁne the variable xl that indicates
the amount of bandwidth sold at link involved with sell
oﬀer l. Note that the variables xd and xl also denote the re-
alization volume of buy oﬀer d and sell oﬀer l, respectively.
Then, the master problem of BCBT-CG can be formulated
as following LP problem:
ˆQ = max
(
∑
d∈D
Edxd − ∑
l∈S
Slxl
)
, (1)
∑
d∈D
∑
p∈Pd
bed pxd p ≤ ∑
l∈S(e)
xl, ∀e∈E , (2)
xd = ∑
p∈Pd
xd p ∀d∈D , (3)
0 ≤ xd ≤ xmaxd , ∀d∈D , (4)
0 ≤ xl ≤ xmaxl , ∀l∈S , (5)
0 ≤ xd p, ∀d∈D,∀p∈Pd . (6)
The objective function (1) aims at the maximization of the
diﬀerence between buyers’ payments and sellers’ revenues
according to the buy and sell prices speciﬁed in the oﬀers.
So, assuming that the oﬀers are sincere, i.e., they repre-
sent real private information of the auction participants,
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the objective function ensures that for given predeﬁned set
of paths Pd the optimal solution of the master problem
gives the allocation with the maximum social welfare. Con-
straints (2) guarantee that for each link the total amount of
bandwidth of this link allocated to all paths predeﬁned for
buy oﬀers cannot be greater than the sum of realization
volumes of all sell oﬀers related to this link. Next group of
constraints (3) state that each buy oﬀer realization volume
equals to the sum of bandwidth allocated at all paths spec-
iﬁed for this oﬀer. Constraints (4) and (5) deﬁne allowable
realization volumes of buy and sell oﬀers, respectively.
The column generation subproblem assumes that for each
link there is deﬁned a unit price, i.e., the price, at which one
unit of link’s bandwidth is sold/purchased. The subproblem
relies on calculating for each end-to-end connection the
cheapest path according to given links’ prices. This can be
done by an arbitrary shortest path algorithm.
Here we formulate the subproblem as a LP problem. Let
the variable xed denote the amount of bandwidth of link e
allocated to end-to-end connection involved with buy of-
fer d. Let the parameter ˆλe indicate the unit price of link e.
Then the solution of subproblem can be obtained by solving
following LP problem:
min ∑
d∈D
∑
e∈E
ˆλexed , (7)
∑
e∈E
avexed =


1 v = sd
0 v 6= sd ,td
−1 v = td
, ∀v∈V,d∈D , (8)
0 ≤ xed , ∀d∈D,∀e∈E . (9)
The objective function (7) minimizes the total cost of
the realization of all end-to-end connections according to
link’s prices ˆλe. Equations (8) deﬁne ﬂow conservation
constraints that must be met for each end-to-end connec-
tion. Simplex algorithm determines vertex solution xˆed of
above LP problem giving for each buy oﬀer d the cheap-
est path p deﬁned by bed p = xˆed with unit buy price equal
to ∑e∈E ˆλexˆed .
The complete allocation rule of the BCBT-CG is deﬁned by
following iterative algorithm based on the column genera-
tion technique that exploits above deﬁnitions of the master
problem Eqs. (1)–(6) and the subproblem Eqs. (7)–(9):
1. For each buy oﬀer d initialize a set of predeﬁned
paths Pd , e.g., set Pd may include one path p being
a solution of the cheapest path subproblem with links’
prices ˆλe = minl∈S(e)Sl .
2. Solve master problem for given Pd: determine op-
timal allocation xˆl , xˆd , xˆd p and optimal values of
dual prices ˆλe i ωˆd corresponding to constraints (2)
and (3), respectively.
3. Solve the cheapest path subproblem for given links’
prices ˆλe: for each buy oﬀer d determine the cheap-
est path realizing relevant end-to-end connection as
a path σ such that bedσ = xˆed for each link e.
4. If for each buy oﬀer d the cheapest path σ fulﬁlls
following condition ∑e∈E ˆλebedσ ≥ ωˆd , then the al-
location xˆl , xˆd , xˆd p detemined in step 2 is optimal.
Otherwise, for each buy oﬀer d, for which the cheap-
est path σ fulﬁlls condition ∑e∈E ˆλebedσ < ωˆd , add
path σ to the set Pd and go to the step 2.
At ﬁrst, the set of paths realizing relevant end-to-end con-
nection is initialized for each buy oﬀer. In the second
step the master problem is solved. In this way the opti-
mal allocation is determined and the unit prices of links
and end-to-end connections are set according to the opti-
mal values of dual prices. In the third step the subproblem
is solved and the cheapest path is found for each buy oﬀer.
In the fourth step for each buy oﬀer it is checked if the
unit price of the cheapest path is greater or equal to unit
price of end-to-end connections. If all paths fulﬁl this con-
dition, the allocation determined in second step is optimal
and the algorithm stops. Otherwise, for each buy oﬀer, for
which the condition is not met, the cheapest path is added
to the set of predeﬁned paths and the algorithm goes to the
second step where the next iteration begins.
3. Experimental Studies
The allocation rules of NSP, BCBT and BCBT-CG models
have been compared in the respect of economic and com-
putational eﬃciency. The experimental studies have been
performed on several test instances concerning allocation
problems on the bandwidth market.
3.1. Test Instances
Test instances for the allocation problems on bandwidth
market have been based on the SNDlib library [19]. Al-
though this library contains data sets for survivable ﬁxed
telecommunication network design problems, the informa-
tion derived from it was very usefull in the preparation
of test instances for allocation problems on the bandwidth
market. Some data such as network topology (nodes and
links) and demands for end-to-end connection have been di-
rectly applied in prepared test instances. Other data such as
links’ capacities, demands’ volumes and distances between
nodes have been used for the generation of the oﬀers’ pa-
rameters. Three data sets from the SNDlib library have
been used: sun, janos-us and giul39. Figure 1 shows the
network topologies given by considered data sets. Table 1
contains information about the number of nodes, links and
end-to-end connections for these data sets.
Table 1
Number of nodes, links and end-to-end connections
for each data set
Data set Nodes Links End-to-end connections
sun 27 102 67
janos-us 26 84 650
giul39 39 172 1471
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Fig. 1. Topologies for considered data sets: (a) sun; (b) giul39; (c) janos-us.
Data sets derived from the SNDlib do not include all data
required to form full test instance of the allocation problem
on the bandwidth market. Some data involved with oﬀers
has had to be generated. It has been assumed that:
– the unit price speciﬁed in oﬀer concerning link/end-
to-end connection is proportional to the distance be-
tween nodes connected by this link/demand,
– the total amount of bandwidth oﬀered for sale (pur-
chase) at particular link (end-to-end connection) is
proportional to the link capacity (demand volume).
Table 2
Number of sell and buy oﬀers for each test instance
Test instance Sell oﬀers Buy oﬀers
sun-2 206 129
sun-4 407 274
sun-6 619 411
janos-us-2 165 1287
janos-us-4 340 2666
janos-us-6 500 3916
giul39-2 330 2938
giul39-4 708 5869
giul39-6 1043 8803
Moreover, in the NSP model it is required that for each
buy oﬀer a set of paths is speciﬁed. It should be noted that
the path speciﬁcation has signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the eco-
nomic and computational eﬃciency of NSP model. Thus,
in the case of NSP model we have decided to consider
100 variants of each test instance. In k-th variant for each
buy oﬀer the k cheapest paths (calculated according to the
minimum unit sell prices speciﬁed in sell oﬀers) is speciﬁed
as a set of possible paths.
On the basis of each considered data set, a three test
instances have been prepared with respectively 2, 4 and
6 oﬀers on average submitted for each link/end-to-end con-
nection. Table 2 presents the number of sell and buy oﬀers
generated for each test instance. As mentioned above, in
the case of NSP model, for each test instance 100 vari-
ants of path speciﬁcation for buy oﬀers have been con-
sidered.
3.2. Computational Efficiency Analysis
For all test instances the allocation have been determined
using NSP, BCBT and BCBT-CG auction models. All LP
problems have been solved by means of CPLEX 12.1 on the
computer with processor Intel Core2 Duo T8100 2.1 GHz,
main memory 3 GB and 32-bit operating system MS Vista.
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Table 3
The time of determining the optimal allocation
Test instance
NSP
BCBT BCBT-CG
k = 5 k = min{k∗,100}
sun-2 0.11 0.02 (k∗=9) 0.23 3.36
sun-4 0.05 0.03 (k∗=4) 0.73 2.96
sun-6 0.09 0.41 (k∗=32) 2.42 3.31
janos-us-2 0.44 2.68 (k∗=38) 8.36 5.01
janos-us-4 0.64 8.71 (k∗=33) 38.92 11.82
janos-us-6 1.19 46.18 (k∗=84) 88.92 20.56
giul39-2 1.26 7.79 (k∗=8) 74.79 32.54
giul39-4 4.26 172.71 (k∗ >100) 34.51 18.25
giul39-6 10.87 402.83 (k∗ >100) 1162.69 176.33
Iterative algorithm constituing allocation rule of BCBT-CG
model has been implemented in AIMMS 3.10.
In the case of NSP model, 100 variants of buy oﬀers have
been considered for all test instances. For each test instance
there has been determined the smallest variant k∗, for which
NSP gives the same value of social welfare as BCBT and
BCBT-CG models. For each variant k < k∗ the allocation
obtained by NSP is worse in terms of social welfare than
the allocation given by BCBT (BCBT-CG) model. On the
other hand, for variants k ≥ k∗ the allocation obtained by
NSP is equivalent in the respect of economic eﬃciency to
allocation given by the BCBT (BCBT-CG) model.
Table 3 presents the time of determining the optimal allo-
cation by each auction model. In the case of NSP model
the results for two variants are shown: k = 5 and k = k∗.
The values of k∗ vary for diﬀerent test instances and are
given in the Table 3. As it can be seen, if the NSP model is
applied then obtaining as eﬃcient allocation as in the case
of BCBT (BCBT-CG) model, it requires that the buyers
specify quite many paths in their buy oﬀers. The min-
imum is four paths, but there are test instances that re-
quires 30 or more paths to be speciﬁed for each buy oﬀer.
For last two test instances, namely giul39-4 and giul39-6,
even 100 paths speciﬁed for each buy oﬀer have not been
enough to ensure that the NSP will result in the same so-
cial welfare as BCBT or BCBT-CG model. For these test
instances the time for the NSP model in Table 3 is given
for k = 100 < k∗.
From the obtained experimental results it follows that in the
most of test instances the NSP model is faster than BCBT
and BCBT-CG. If we consider only the variants of test
instances with k = 5 then it turns out that NSP model is
undoubtedly the fastest one. However, it should be noted
that for variants with k = 5 only for the test instance sun-4
the NSP model provide as eﬃcient allocation as the BCBT
or BCBT-CG model. Also, for the NSP model, the time of
determining the k-th cheapest paths by the buyers is here
not taken into account.
Considering variants of test instances with k = k∗, we
can see that there are test instances for which BCBT or
BCBT-CG requires less time than NSP in order to com-
pute the optimal allocation. The allocation time for BCBT
is shorter than in the case of NSP model for the test in-
stance giul39-4. In turn, the BCBT-CG model is faster
than NSP for three test instances: janos-us-6, giul39-4
and giul39-6.
Comparing the allocation times for the BCBT and
BCBT-CG models, we can see that for the larger test
instances based on data sets janos-us and giul39, the
BCBT-CG model requires less time to determine the op-
timal allocation than the BCBT model, and the diﬀerence
is signiﬁcant especially for the last test instance giul39-6.
Thus, the computational eﬃciency of determining the opti-
mal allocation can be improved by applying the BCBT-CG
model instead of BCBT.
3.3. Economic Efficiency Analysis
The BCBT and BCBT-CG models are equivalent in the
respect of economic eﬃciency as they give the allocations
providing the same social welfare. In the case of NSP
model, the value of resulting social welfare depends on
the path speciﬁcations made by the buyers in their buy
oﬀers. The allocation obtained by NSP for variant k of
given test instance will be at least as eﬃcient as the one
obtained for variant k− 1. Moreover, the social welfare
provided by the NSP model cannot be higher than the one
given by the BCBT or BCBT-CG model. Here, we analyze
how the social welfare obtained by the NSP model changes
in the relation to the opitmal allocation given by BCBT
(BCBT-CG) considering the ﬁrst 10 variants of each test
instance.
Table 4 presents the ratio between the value of social wel-
fare provided by NSP and the one given by the BCBT
(BCBT-CG). Experimental results show that this ratio for
all considered test instances is at least 95% just for k greater
than 3. If k = 5, then the ratio is 99% or higher for almost
all test instances except for two (giul39-4 and giul39-6).
So, if all buyers can anticipate and specify in the buy of-
fers the ﬁve cheapest path realizing demanded end-to-end
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Table 4
The ratio between the value of social welfare provided by NSP and BCBT (BCBT-CG)
Test instance k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8 k = 9 k = 10
sun-2 0.93 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1 1
sun-4 0.93 0.98 0.99 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
sun-6 0.93 0.95 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
janos-us-2 0.89 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
janos-us-4 0.95 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
janos-us-6 0.82 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
giul39-2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1 1 1
giul39-4 0.8 0.9 0.93 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98
giul39-6 0.83 0.91 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99
connections then it is highly possible that the NSP would
determine the allocation, which is almost as economically
eﬃcient as the allocation given by BCBT.
However, it should be noted that the NSP model does not
guarantee as eﬃcient allocation as BCBT or BCBT-CG
model. For some test instances, e.g., giul39-4 and giul39-6,
even if the byuers would know the sell prices of each link
and specify the 100 least expensive paths in their oﬀers the
NSP model leads to the social welfare that is lower than the
one that can be provided by the application of the BCBT
(BCBT-CG) model (see Table 3).
4. Conclusions
In this paper we compare three auction models that treat
bandwidth as divisible commodity and support end-to-end
connection trading. One of these models, called BCBT-CG,
is proposed here as a modiﬁcation of BCBT model. The
BCBT-CG allows for determining the allocation that is
equivalent to the one obtained by the BCBT model. How-
ever, it applies as an allocation rule the iterative algorithm
based on the column generation technique that has better
computational eﬃciency than the BCBT allocation rule.
Experimental studies verify that the BCBT-CG model can
be used instead of BCBT to reduce the time of determining
the optimal allocation.
Compared to BCBT and BCBT-CG models, the NSP model
is less convenient from the buyer point of view as it requires
from him to specify the paths realizing demanded end-to-
end connection. In the case of NSP model, the buyer has to
know the network topology and he bears the responsibility
for choosing the appropriate set of paths, which would give
him the best payoﬀ. On the other hand, in the BCBT and
BCBT-CG models the buyer must only specify the source
and destination nodes of the desired end-to-end connection.
The allocation rules of these auction models are responsible
for determining the optimal paths.
From the experimental results it follows that the NSP model
does not guarantee as eﬃcient allocation as the BCBT and
BCBT-CG models, even if all buyers specify the 100 least
expensive paths in their buy oﬀers. The merit of NSP
is that it allows for the fast determination of almost op-
timal allocation requiring just a ﬁve cheapest paths to be
speciﬁed by each buyer. However, the time of determin-
ing the allocation by the NSP increases with the number
of paths speciﬁed in the buy oﬀers and if there is many
such a paths, the NSP may be slower than the BCBT and
BCBT-CG models.
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